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Effects of Meat Recalls on
Futures Market Prices
Jayson L. Lusk and Ted C. Schroeder
The number of meat recalls has increased markedly in recent years. This research examines the
impact of beef and pork recall announcements on nearby daily live cattle and lean hog futures market
prices, respectively. Results indicate medium-sized beef recalls that are of serious health concerns
have a marginally negative impact on short-term live cattle futures prices. However, results are not
robust across recall size and severity. This research suggests that if there is any systematic change in
cattle and hog demand due to meat recalls, it likely occurs over an extended period of time and only
in certain cases does it noticeably affect daily futures prices.
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Recently, considerable attention has been directed
at quantifying the effects of nonprice factors in
meat demand studies. In an attempt to identify the
causes of structural change in the beef industry (as
reported by Moschini, 1991; Moschini and Meilke,
1989; and Eales and Unnevehr, 1988), numerous
studies have examined factors such as food safety,
health and nutrition, media, and advertising on meat
demand.
For example, Kinnucan et al. (1997) found
adverse health information had a strong negative
influence on beef demand and a slightly negative in-
fluence on the demand for pork. Capps and Schmitz
(1991) also observed cholesterol information was
negatively associated with meat demand. In their
investigation of the impact of brand and generic
advertising on meat demand, Brester and Schroeder
(1995) reported brand advertising had a significant
effect on beef, pork, and poultry demand. They also
found that poultry advertising negatively influenced
beef and pork demand. These types of studies often
employ aggregate consumption and retail data over
extended periods of time [e.g., Kinnucan et al.
(1997) used quarterly data from 1976S1993]. One
exception to this approach is an analysis by Capps
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(1989), who examined the effects of advertising in
demand analysis using scanner data. Due to the
nature of the data and the construct of the analyses,
the data may not reflect short-run changes in meat
demand because they may be masked when
performing aggregate time-series analysis. Short-
run changes in meat demand are extremely
important, especially to those involved in futures
markets.
To determine short-run shifts in meat demand,
Robenstein and Thurman (1996) examined the
effect of health-related information on futures
market prices. They evaluated the immediate
impact of articles published in the Wall Street
Journal on live cattle, feeder cattle, pork belly, and
live hog futures prices. Robenstein and Thurman
concluded futures markets had no discernable
reaction to these public releases of information.
Although they found no significant short-run
impact of health-related articles, other health-
related information might influence short-run
changes in futures markets.
Recently, food safety concerns for meat products
have escalated. Numerous food products have
transmitted foodborne illnesses to consumers via a
myriad of known and unknown foodborne patho-
gens (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
1999). Common meat foodborne bacteria include
Listeria monocytogenes, Escherichia coli (E. coli
O157:H7), and Salmonella.
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Recent research by Flake and Patterson (1999)
examined the impact of health information and food
safety on beef demand. A food safety information
index was constructed by counting the number of
Associated Press articles published on bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), E. coli, and
salmonellosis contamination in beef. Based on their
findings, food safety concerns had a modest nega-
tive impact on meat demand.
Using quarterly time-series data from 1982S98,
Schroeder, Marsh, and Mintert (2000) estimated the
impact of the number of Food Safety Inspection
Service (FSIS) meat recalls on meat demand. They
found beef recalls significantly influenced beef
demand. Their estimated elasticity was !0.0065,
implying a 1% increase in the number of meat
recalls was associated with a !0.0065% decline in
beef demand. Although the estimated impact of
beef recall events on beef demand was relatively
small, in certain years when recall events increased
markedly, demand for beef declined by more than
5% as a result of beef recalls.
Beef and pork recalls have the potential to
adversely affect meat demand in the short run (i.e.,
day-to-day), in addition to the longer-run impacts
identified in previous studies. An information shock
such as a meat recall, if the event were an important
short-run demand determinant, would be expected
to cause a downward futures price movement as
traders react to potential negative consumer
response. The magnitude of the daily price
movement would be expected to depend upon the
severity of the recall, e.g., volume of meat recalled
and likely health hazard consequence of consuming
the product. Despite the potential importance of
beef and pork recall events on daily cattle and hog
futures market prices, no previous study has esti-
mated their impacts.
Over the past 15 years, the number of meat
recalls has risen. In 1982, there were only six beef
and five pork FSIS recalls. This number increased
to 18 beef and 19 pork recalls in 1999 [U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA)/FSIS]. Figure
1 shows the number of FSIS recalls from 1982
through 1999. Some of the increased incidence of
recalls is likely attributable to heightened public
concern over foodborne illnesses, prompting closer
regulatory scrutiny of meat product safety. For ex-
ample, the first E. coli O157:H7 FSIS recall (beef’s
most common bacterial contamination problem) did
not occur until 1988. However, since 1988, E. coli-
related beef recalls have averaged over three per
year. Understanding how futures markets behave
when meat recalls occur is becoming increasingly
important because of the rising number of product
recalls.
The goal of this analysis is to quantify the effects
of beef and pork recall announcements on daily live
cattle and lean hog futures market prices, respec-
tively. The magnitude of change in the futures
market price as well as the length of time required
for the price to return to its “normal” path following
a product recall are examined. Factors hypothesized
to be important in affecting magnitude and degree
of persistence associated with a meat recall are the
size of the meat recall and the severity of the recall
(i.e., the amount of health concern associated with
the recall). Our results indicate that, in general,
pork and beef recall events have not systematically
appreciably impacted daily lean hog and live cattle
futures markets.
Data and Procedures
The recall data for this study were obtained from
the USDA/FSIS. The data set contains over 500
observations resulting from all reported meat recalls
from 1982 through 1999, and contains meat recalls
for pork, beef, chicken, turkey, and other miscellan-
eous meat products. Reasons for recalls range from
bacterial contamination and foreign material to mis-
labeling of the product. Meat in need of recall may
be identified through self-inspection by meat packers
or processors, as a part of FSIS tests, by FSIS field
investigators, or by consumer complaints.
Upon learning about the potential for unsafe
meat, the FSIS conducts a preliminary investigation
to determine if a recall is necessary. Once a recall
is deemed necessary, the public is notified via a
press release and a Recall Notification Report is
issued.
1 All recalls in the data set are self-contained
events; that is, no “related” recall events—where
one batch of meat is recalled and then in a few
days a second associated batch is also called back—
occur in the data set during the 1982S1999 time
period analyzed.
1  There is some potential for information about a recall to “leak” out
prior to being announced. However, the FSIS notes its goal is to “protect
the public health by ensuring that potentially hazardous foods are
removed from commerce as quickly as possible.” How much information
may be known prior to an announcement likely varies on a case-by-case
basis. The individuals most likely to possess information about the recalls
prior to announcement would be those employed by the meat packing
plants and/or the USDA. Using such recall information to profit in the
futures market would be considered insider trading, and is therefore
illegal. We have examined daily price changes one and two days prior to
the recall event and found results similar to those reported later in the

































































The recalls are identified by FSIS as being in one
of three classes:
P Class 1, involving a health hazard situation where
there is a reasonable probability that consump-
tion of the product will cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death;
P Class 2, involving a potential health hazard
situation where there is a remote probability of
adverse health consequences from the use of the
product; or
P Class 3, involving a situation where the use of
the product is not likely to cause adverse health
consequences.
In this analysis we refer to Class 1 recalls as
“serious,” and Class 2 and Class 3 recalls as “non-
serious.” From 1982 through 1999, there were 158
beef recalls and 143 pork recalls. Of the total num-
ber of recalls, 98 beef and 90 pork recalls posed
serious health concerns.
Additionally, each recall announcement includes
the number of pounds recalled. Over the 1982S
1999 study period, the size of the recalls ranged
from zero pounds to over 4 million pounds.
2 With
such a large range in the recall volumes, rather than
using this variable as continuous, it was converted
to five categorical variables that divided each meat
type into one of five equal (by number of occur-
rences) recall size categories.
For beef, the size categories were segregated as
follows: size1 = less than 1,162 lbs., size2 = between
1,162 lbs. and 4,516 lbs., size3 = between 4,516 lbs.
and 32,000 lbs., size4 = between 32,000 lbs. and
175,288 lbs., and size5 = greater than 175,288 lbs.
Similarly, for pork, size categories were segregated
as follows: size1 = less than 635 lbs., size2 =
between 635 lbs. and 4,150 lbs., size3 = between
4,150 lbs. and 14,400 lbs., size4 = between 14,400
lbs. and 45,512 lbs., and size5 = greater than 45,512
lbs.
3 Figures 2 and 3 provide summary statistics of
the meat recalls.
Daily futures market prices for the live cattle and
lean hog futures contracts were obtained from the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. To construct a con-
tinuous series, futures prices for each trading day in
the nearby contract were used for the analysis.
Because prices in the nearby contract month often
become volatile, the price series was rolled over to
the next futures contract on the first of each month
in which a contract closed. Further, when calculat-
ing the daily futures price change, a price in one
contract month was never subtracted from a price in
another contract month. In other words, the effects
of recall events were determined by examining
daily price changes in a particular contract.
2  There were several reported recalls, five beef and seven pork, where
zero pounds of meat were recalled. Each of these instances occurred prior
to 1987. It is unclear how a recall with zero pounds can be considered a
recall. Because of the ambiguity of these events, we deleted these obser-
vations from the data set.
3  The recall size categories for beef and pork are not equivalent be-
cause we used the distribution of recall pounds for each species to
determine the size categories. Rather than construct a uniform size classi-
fication for both species, we constructed species-specific size categories.
Specifically, the recall population was split into five equal-size categories
for each species. Constructing the size categories in this manner avoids
irrelevant size comparisons across species. We also conducted the
analysis with three (small, medium, and large) size categories, rather than
five. The same general conclusions were generated regardless of the
construction of the size categories. These results are available from the
authors upon request.























































































Figure 2.  Meat recalls by commodity, severity, and date
size1 recalls = less than 1,162 lbs. for beef, and less than 635 lbs. for pork
size2 recalls = between 1,162 and 4,516 lbs. for beef, and between 635 and 4,150 lbs. for pork
size3 recalls = between 4,516 and 32,000 lbs. for beef, and between 4,150 and 14,400 lbs. for pork
size4 recalls = between 32,000 and 175,288 lbs. for beef, and between 14,400 and 45,512 lbs. for pork
size5 recalls = greater than 175,288 lbs. for beef, and greater than 45,512 lbs. for pork
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Meat recalls are expected to adversely affect beef
and pork demand. If consumers become uncertain
of the safety of their food when a meat recall
occurs, retail demand is likely to fall. In turn,
derived demand for meat (i.e., live cattle and lean
hog demand) is expected to decline. Meat product
recalls likely erode all consumer confidence in meat
from that species, regardless of whether the recall
occurred on a regional or national basis. Most
bacteria in meat products are not readily detectable
by the consumer, and as such, consumers must
assume the product is safe unless other information
becomes available. Such information comes in the
form of local and national recalls. Further, given
the concentrated nature of the meat packing indus-
try, meat from one plant may be distributed across
many varied regions of the U.S., causing all con-
sumers to become concerned about any specific
recall event.
Futures traders, realizing the impact of product
recalls on consumer demand, and knowing derived
demand for meat will decline, are assumed to act on
this change. Market efficiency hypotheses imply
that the futures market price is the best determinant
of expected price at some future date. Given that
futures markets are efficient, traders incorporate all
relevant information in today’s expectation of the
future price. If meat recalls are important demand
determinants, recall information should be reflected
in traders’ expectations of the future price. Assum-
ing a positively sloped industry supply curve, one
would expect prices of meat to fall in the face of a
meat recall because of the decline in consumer con-
fidence.
In this study, we follow methods commonly
employed in event study literature. In this type of
analysis, an event is identified and prices during
and after the event are compared to the previous
equilibrium price. This methodology frequently has
been used to examine the impact of market reports
on futures prices (see, e.g., Carter and Galopin,
1993; Colling, Irwin, and Zulaf, 1997; or Schroe-
der, Blair, and Mintert, 1990).
Recently, event study analysis also has been used
to examine impacts of the announcement of “green”
marketing strategies on stock prices (Mathur and
Mathur, 2000). In this case, the meat recall marks
the “event.” Here, the meat recall announcement is
treated as potentially unexpected information intro-
duced into the market at random points in time.
First, to determine whether meat recall events
adversely affect futures prices, daily price changes
over the entire 1982S1999 time period were
examined.
4 Daily price changes when a meat recall
was announced were compared to all other daily
price changes. Because information about the
recalls typically was not released at any routine
time of day, there was the potential for an announce-
ment to occur before or after trading on day t. If a
recall was announced before the close of trading on





P is the nearby futures price, t is day, and the super-
script S represents the settlement price. However, if
the recall was announced after trading on day t, the





script O represents the opening price.
Because we cannot be certain about the exact
time of the release of information during the day,
we conduct the analysis considering both possibil-
ities. That is, the dependent variable in the analysis


















where P is the nearby futures price, t is day, sizeti
denotes dummy variables that take the value of 1 if
there was a given size recall (i refers to recall size
categories as previously defined) in period t and 0
otherwise, serioust is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the recall in period t was Class 1
and 0 otherwise, and β, α, and γ represent param-
eters to be estimated.
5
Although the USDA reports three recall severity
categories, we reclassified recalls into two groups:
serious (Class 1) and non-serious (Class 2 and
Class 3). The reclassification reduces the number of
parameters to estimate and reduces multicollinearity
between explanatory variables.
6 
4  Consistent with previous event study literature, we analyze daily price
changes following an “event” (Carter and Galopin, 1993; Colling, Irwin,
and Zulaf, 1997; Mathur and Mathur, 2000; Robenstein and Thurman,
1996; Schroeder, Blair, and Mintert, 1990). One could also conduct an
analysis of intra-day price changes following recall events. The analysis
presented here examines daily price changes only, and does not attempt
to draw any inferences regarding the potential effects of meat recalls on
intra-day futures price changes.
5  The dependent variable could be formulated as percentage change or
daily return to a futures contract, i.e., ln(Pt) ! ln(Pt!1). Results are robust
across alternative constructions of the dependent variable; thus dis-
cussion of the analysis is limited to the model using absolute price
differences.
6  We also conducted the analysis segregated by three severity classes
and found the general results presented here are robust to the reclassi-
fication. Results of the alternative classification are available from the
authors upon request.52   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
If any meat recall places downward pressure on
nearby futures prices the day after the recall, then
all βi and αi will be less than zero. Since many
recalls are small and involve inconsequential health
concerns, β1 or β2 may not be statistically less than
zero, but the signs of β3 through β5 should indicate
the impact of sizeable recalls. Severity of a meat
recall may be evaluated by testing the sign and
statistical significance of αi. Serious recalls of size-
able quantity cause a downward shift in futures
prices if α3 through α5 are less than zero. 
Finally, because changes in other commodity
markets influence daily changes in live cattle or
lean hog futures markets, ∆Mkt∆t was added to the
model. For this analysis, the foodstuff component
of the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) index
was used, where ∆Mkt is the daily change in the
index of the foodstuff component (∆Mkt∆t = Mktt –
Mktt!1). If the live cattle or lean hog nearby futures
prices tend to move in the same direction as other
“foodstuff” futures prices, γ will be positive.
7
Next, to determine effects of meat recalls over
time, the futures price prior to the recall is com-
pared to the price at specific dates after the recall.
In an informationally efficient futures market,
prices would react quickly to new information.
However, at the time of a recall announcement, the
impact of an event may not be fully known. For
example, if illness or death results from tainted
meat in a particular recall, this information may not
be known until days after the initial announcement.
In addition, follow-up details of the nature of the
recall may be forthcoming over the next few days.
Therefore, testing first the daily price movement
after a recall should measure the impact of the
original recall announcement.
Calculating the change in futures price sev-
eral days after the recall allows us to test whether
additional information may have entered the
market. A model is formulated where the price
difference k days after a recall announcement is de-
pendent upon several independent factors, as shown
in equation (2):













where P is the nearby futures price, the superscript
S indicates settlement prices, k0{1,2,...,n}, t refers
to the day of the recall, and all other variables are as
previously defined. ∆Mkt∆t represents changes in
other foodstuff prices from time period t to time
period k that may influence changes in the nearby
live cattle or lean hog futures contracts (∆Mkt∆t =
Mktt+k ! Mktt!1).
To minimize the effects of market movements
associated with “Cattle on Feed” or “Hogs and Pigs”
reports, any recall occurring one day before, during,
or one day after a report was removed from the data
set. Thus, 13 beef and five pork recalls were
dropped from the data set. This reduces the number
of beef and pork recall events to 145 and 138,
respectively. If the futures price is unaffected by
any meat recall announcement, then we should fail
to reject the hypothesis that βi = αi = 0 œ i. At k=1,
the first day after a recall, effects are expected to
be most pronounced. However, as time progresses,
impacts of the recall are expected to decay. To
determine when the effects cease to exist, the afore-
mentioned hypothesis will be tested at various
times, k.
Since dependent variables in equations (1) and
(2) are bounded by “limit moves,” estimation using
ordinary least squares is inappropriate because it
may lead to biased estimates. Live cattle futures
prices cannot move by more than $1.50/cwt in one
day, and lean hog futures prices cannot move by
more than $2/cwt in one day. The double-limit tobit
model accounts for the probability a “limit move”
may occur, and the conditional mean of the depen-
dent variable given a limit move does not occur
(Greene, 2000).
Since price changes in equations (1) and (2)
(with k=1) are two days apart (bounded by limit
moves of $3/cwt for live cattle and $4/cwt for lean
hogs), a double-limit tobit will be used if a sizeable
number of limit moves occurred in the dependent
variable; otherwise, ordinary least squares is appro-
priate.
7  Selecting an index to control for “other” market movements presents
a challenge between choosing an index that is too close to modeling the
same price series in the analysis (e.g., having a near identity) and using
an index that is too general and does not reflect relevant market move-
ments. We felt an appropriate index falling in between these two extremes
was the CRB foodstuffs index because the meat product futures being
modeled are likely to respond to general foodstuff economic conditions.
More specifically, the CRB food index is an unweighted geometric mean
of lard, butter, soybean oil, cocoa, corn, Kansas City wheat, Minneapolis
wheat, sugar, hog, and steer spot market price relatives. Naturally there
are other supply and demand shocks that influence futures price changes.
We have included the CRB index to attempt to control for such market
movements; however, there are likely other factors that influence live
cattle and lean hog futures prices. Controlling for all these movements
would represent an extensive undertaking beyond the scope of this
analysis. Because the study period spans 18 years and we examined over
100 recall events, the effects of other supply and demand shocks should
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Serious Recalls Above 1,725 lbs.
Results
Figures 4 and 5 compare the total sample (1982S
1999) of daily price changes in nearby live cattle
and lean hog futures prices, respectively, to the
daily futures price changes when relatively large
serious meat recalls were announced. To illustrate
the impact of recall size and seriousness, figures 4
and 5 only include serious recalls that are size-
able—in the upper two-thirds of the size distribu-
tion (greater than 2,400 lbs. and 1,725 lbs. for beef
and pork, respectively).
As seen from figure 4, the percentage of trading
days in the two most negative price change cate-
gories is higher for the recall distribution than for
the total sample of live cattle daily price changes.
  Figure 4.  Percentage distribution of daily changes in nearby live cattle 
  futures prices, typical days and one day after a beef recall, 1982S S S S1999
  Figure 5.  Percentage distribution of daily changes in nearby lean hog 
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Further, there is a lower percentage of trading days
in all positive price change categories for the beef
recall distribution than for the total sample. These
two findings together indicate that sizeable beef
recalls of serious health concern have the tendency
to cause a downward shift in nearby live cattle
prices. As shown in figure 5, the daily price change
distribution for large serious pork recalls is not
noticeably different from the daily price change dis-
tribution for the total sample.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the effects of beef and
pork recall severity on daily changes in live cattle
and lean hog futures prices, respectively. Figures
6 and 7 only include price changes after a meat
recall announcement. For the live cattle futures
contract, downward price movements occurred more
 Figure 6.  Percentage distribution of changes in nearby live cattle futures 
 prices one day after a beef recall announcement, by severity, 1982S S S S1999
 Figure 7.  Percentage distribution of changes in nearby lean hog futures 
 prices one day after a pork recall announcement, by severity, 1982S S S S1999Lusk and Schroeder Effects of Meat Recalls on Futures Market Prices   55
frequently for serious beef recalls than for non-
serious recalls. In addition, positive price move-
ments occurred less frequently for the serious recall
distribution than for the non-serious recall distri-
bution. For the lean hog futures contract, the
distributions of daily price changes for serious and
non-serious pork recalls are virtually indistinguish-
able.
To test whether size and severity of meat recalls
statistically affect live cattle and lean hog futures
prices, equations (1) and (2) are estimated for beef
and pork recalls. For reference, the dependent var-
iable in table 1 is the daily price change (opening
price in t+1 minus settlement prices in t!1) in the
nearby live cattle futures contract from 1982S1999.
The only beef recall events statistically affecting
live cattle futures prices are associated with size3
recalls. Surprisingly, size3 recalls have both negative
and positive effects on daily price changes depend-
ing upon whether the recall was associated with a
serious health concern. The estimated size3(serious
coefficient indicates futures prices were $0.41/cwt
lower when there was a serious size3 recall than
when there was no serious size3 recall. However,
the size3 recall coefficient, which includes both
serious and non-serious recalls, is statistically sig-
nificant and positive. Strictly interpreted, this result
reflects an increase in futures prices when a non-
serious size3 recall was announced.
Because of the interaction between size and
seriousness, the net effect of these two findings
suggests a medium-sized beef recall of serious
health concern was associated with a $0.12/cwt
decline in nearby live cattle futures prices. Whether
this amount is economically significant is addressed
later in this section.
It is unclear why serious size3 recalls affect
nearby live cattle futures prices, but size4 and size5
serious recalls do not. While one would expect mar-
ket participants to be more concerned with larger
recalls, our results do not support this hypothesis.
In general, there does not appear to be a strong
relationship between the meat recall occurrences
and daily changes in live cattle futures prices. As
expected, estimates for the ∆Mkt variable show
nearby live cattle futures prices are positively
affected by price changes in other foodstuff prices.
Table 2 reports results of several hypotheses tests
from equations (1) and (2). Joint F-tests do not sup-
port the hypotheses that nearby live cattle futures
prices are influenced by (a) large recall, (b) serious
recall, or (c) large, serious recall announcements.
Although figure 2 indicates the price change distri-
bution following a recall announcement is shifted
leftward as compared to the price change distribution
of all trading days, estimates from equation (1) sug-
gest differences between the two distributions are
not statistically significant. Furthermore, based on
estimates from equation (2) (see hypotheses test
results in table 2), in the days following a recall
announcement, no further recall information influ-
ences the live cattle futures market.
Table 3 shows results of equation (1) for the lean
hog futures contract. All recall events were statis-
tically insignificant. The only variable having a
statistically significant influence on daily changes
in lean hog futures prices was ∆Mkt, the variable
representing changes in other foodstuff market
conditions. Results of several hypotheses tests are
presented in table 4. Pork recall announcements, of
all size and severity, do not appear to appreciably
impact lean hog futures prices. In addition, from
equation (2) estimates, meat recall information,
potentially introduced several days after the initial
announcement, did not have a significant influence
on nearby lean hog futures prices.
Given the results in tables 1S4, it appears the
impacts of meat recalls on futures prices are not
large from a statistical standpoint. However, these
results say little about the economic significance
of recall events. In other words, the estimated
effects may be economically large, but the data too
noisy to produce statistically significant results
(McCloskey, 1985).
To explore this issue, two questions were
addressed: (a) What is the economic impact of a
change in futures prices implied by the coefficient
estimates reported in tables 1 and 3? and (b) How
do the sizes of coefficient estimates reported in
tables 1 and 3 compare to “typical” changes one
might expect in the market?
First, the point estimates reported in tables 1 and
3 imply meat recalls may influence futures prices
by as little as $0.01/cwt or by as much as $0.30/cwt
(note coefficient estimates must be interpreted in
light of interaction effects). The average price
change after a recall, predicted by the regression
results (in absolute value), is $0.08/cwt for beef and
$0.19/cwt for pork.
Of interest is how these estimated price changes
might impact a trader’s economic standing. Assum-
ing a futures price of $67/cwt (the sample average
for live cattle) and given a contract size of 40,000
lbs., a $0.10/cwt change in the futures price results
in a $40 change in the value of one futures contract,
or a 0.15% increase or decrease in contract value,56   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1.  Effects of Beef Recall on Daily Price Changes in Nearby Live Cattle Futures Prices, All
















Constant — 0.024** 0.010 size1(serious 23 0.145 0.301
size1 29 !0.078 0.268 size2(serious 20 !0.038 0.264
size2 29 0.074 0.219 size3(serious 13 !0.408* 0.245
size3 29 0.284* 0.164 size4(serious 18 0.057 0.252
size4 29 !0.114 0.199 size5(serious 16 0.019 0.246
size5 29 0.011 0.183 ∆Mkt — 0.039** 0.007






2 = 0.01; Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.68.
a Parameter estimates were obtained from ordinary least squares regression; there was only one “limit move.”
Table 2.  Results of Hypotheses Tests of Impacts of Beef Recall Announcements on Live Cattle Futures
Prices
Influence of . . . Hypothesis Test
 a F-Statistic P-Value
Equation (1):  Large recall announcements β3 = β4 = β5 = 0 1.11 0.35
                         All serious recall announcements αi = 0 œ i 0.62 0.69
                         Serious recall announcements of sizeable quantity α3 = α4 = α5 = 0 0.94 0.42
                         All recall announcements αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.44 0.93
Equation (2):  All recall announcements (k = 1) αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.51 0.88
                         All recall announcements (k = 2) αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.75 0.67
                         All recall announcements (k = 3) αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.78 0.65
a Refer to text equations (1) and (2) for notational definitions.
Table 3.  Effects of Pork Recall on Daily Price Changes in Nearby Lean Hog Futures Prices, All Trading
















Constant — 0.008 0.014 size1(serious 25 0.013 0.592
size1 28 0.198 0.560 size2(serious 16 0.479 0.391
size2 26 !0.269 0.307 size3(serious 17 !0.145 0.366
size3 29 0.299 0.280 size4(serious 17 !0.441 0.376
size4 28 0.146 0.293 size5(serious 13 !0.173 0.374














from OLS regression = 1.63.
a Parameter estimates were obtained from  a double-limit tobit model; there were a total of 14 “limit moves.”
b Sigma is the disturbance standard deviation from the tobit likelihood function.
Table 4.  Results of Hypotheses Tests of Impacts of Pork Recall Announcements on Lean Hog Futures
Prices
Influence of . . . Hypothesis Test
 a F-Statistic P-Value
Equation (1):  Large recall announcements β3 = β4 = β5 = 0 0.47 0.70
                         All serious recall announcements αi = 0 œ i 0.66 0.65
                         Serious recall announcements of sizeable quantity α3 = α4 = α5 = 0 0.60 0.61
                         All recall announcements αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.66 0.76
Equation (2):  All recall announcements (k = 1) αi = βi = 0 œ i 1.21 0.27
                         All recall announcements (k = 2) αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.91 0.52
                         All recall announcements (k = 3) αi = βi = 0 œ i 0.60 0.82
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depending upon the trader’s position in the market.
Alternatively, a $0.35/cwt change in the futures
price results in a 0.52% change in the value of the
futures contract(s) held. For these ranges of price
movements, the change in the value of the futures
contract(s) appears, in percentage terms, rather
small.
To address the second question, we examined the
distribution of daily changes in live cattle and lean
hog futures prices from 1982 through 1999. Over
80% of the daily live cattle price changes during
this period were greater than $0.10/cwt, and over
50% were greater than $0.35/cwt. With regard to
the lean hog futures contract, over 88% of the
1982S1999 daily price changes were greater than
$0.10/cwt, and over 66% were greater than $0.35/
cwt. Taken together, these results suggest traders
routinely experience futures price changes in excess
of the movements potentially caused by meat re-
calls. In sum, our findings imply that meat recalls
have little influence on live cattle and lean hog
futures prices, both statistically and economically.
Implications and Conclusions
Identifying shifts in meat demand has been a heavily
discussed topic in recent years. Much of the research
in this area has focused on long-run changes in
meat demand due to health-related information,
media reports, or advertisement. Product recalls by
meat processors also have the potential to influence
meat demand, both in the short and long run. The
number of meat recalls has increased over the past
15 years. With the publicity of recent meat con-
tamination events, the public is becoming more
concerned with the safety of beef and pork. Public
awareness of the number of recalls and the risk
associated with the occurrence likely reduces con-
sumer confidence when a recall occurs.
This study has examined the short-run impact of
beef and pork recalls on nearby live cattle and lean
hog futures market prices, respectively. In general,
daily live cattle and lean hog futures prices were
not significantly affected by beef and pork recall
announcements. Results indicate that medium-sized
beef recalls of severe health consequence may neg-
atively influence live cattle futures prices; how-
ever, the potential impact is economically small.
Graphical analysis tends to lend some support to
this finding. Nevertheless, the result that beef recall
announcements influence nearby live cattle futures
prices is not robust across weight classifications or
severity.
In general, both beef and pork recalls have mar-
ginal impacts on daily futures market prices at
most. Intuitively, one might expect live cattle and
lean hog futures prices to respond to meat recall
events; however, there are a number of reasons why
no relationship exists. It is possible that changes in
meat demand occur at a slow rate and thus are not
reflected in one- or two-day changes in futures
market prices. Perhaps the impacts of recalls on
meat demand are more cumulative in nature and
gradually reduce market demand over time instead
of causing notable short-run declines.
It may also be that meat recalls have a larger
influence on disaggregated meat products such as
boneless beef (which is used to produce ground
beef) than on aggregate products such as cattle or
hogs. Alternatively, futures markets may not react
to meat recalls because consumers already perceive
some distribution of risk in meat consumption, and
the market has already incorporated this information.
In this case, recall events do not alter consumers’
perceptions of risk, but are simply a realization of
an event consumers expect from a perceived recall
distribution.
Finally, there is the chance that only very large
recalls affect consumer demand for beef, and thus
traders’ demand for live cattle. At the same time,
these sizeable recalls may invoke a supply response
resulting in a leftward shift in supply. Given the
following assumptions—annual beef production =
25.7 billion lbs./year, operating days/year = 261,
elasticity of beef demand = !0.57, price of live
cattle = $67/cwt, and no demand response—a 4.47
million pound recall (the largest beef recall in the
data set) would result in a $5.33/cwt, $1.06/cwt,
and $0.25/cwt increase in live cattle futures price if
all tainted beef were recalled in one day, week, or
month, respectively.
However, this result only holds for the most
extreme cases. For example, the largest size4 recall
would only induce a $0.01/cwt shift in supply
assuming all meat was recalled in one month (the
most likely assumption). Yet, one cannot rule out
the possibility that only large recalls affect con-
sumer demand and these same events are the only
recalls to invoke a significant supply response,
which in effect might leave the futures price un-
changed.
8
Regardless of the reason, meat recall information
is apparently not a large concern to futures market
participants. Our results imply traders are oblivious
8  We credit an anonymous reviewer for the last two explanations.58   April 2002 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
to the information, our models cannot detect the
market reaction, or there is no perceived relation-
ship between live cattle and lean hog demand and
meat recalls in the short run. However, futures
traders are not likely to be ignorant of important
market forces. If live cattle or lean hog demand is
adversely affected by meat recalls, it is presumed
this change is gradual.
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